Abstract:We show the Boxdot Conjecture holds for a limited but familiar range of Lemmon-Scott axioms. We re-introduce the language of essence and accident, first introduced by J. Marcos, and show how it aids our strategy.
We now discuss the language of essence and accident and its relevance to our strategy. The initial study is in Marcos [10] , and we re-introduce the basic ideas here. Given the normal modal language, we can define the operators and with, φ def = (φ ∧ ¦¬φ) φ def = (φ 3 £φ)
These operators are the negations of each other (not duals). Thus:
Significantly for our purposes, we have:
Read φ as: φ is accidentally true. Read φ as: φ is essentially true. Synonymously, we may read φ as symbolizing the contingent truth of φ (true in this world though false in another). The study of the language of essence and accident may be seen as a variation on the study of contingency logics (where an operator symbolizing ¦φ ∧ ¦¬φ is studied (see Brogan [2] -presenting Aristotle's views-and Cresswell [3] , Humberstone [7] , Kuhn [8] , Lomuscio and Van der Hoek [9] , Montgomery and Routley [11] , Mortensen [12] , Steinsvold [13] , Zolin [15] ).
 1.2
The set of formulas of essence and accident, F EA , is that subset of the formulas of normal modal logic which can be formed using only propositional variables, the Boolean connectives, parentheses, , and .
We now prove a useful fact about the members of F EA .  1.3 for all φ P F EA ,
K tφ 6 φ
Proof: We show by induction on the complexity of formulas. Clearly, tp = p and tc = c. By definition, t(φ 3 ψ) = (tφ 3 tψ), thus K (tφ 3 tψ) 6 t(φ 3 ψ). By the induction hypothesis we know that K φ 6 tφ and K ψ 6 tψ. Thus, by replacement we know K (φ 3 ψ) 6 t(φ 3 ψ).
To show K t φ 6 φ, 1) K (φ ∧ (¦¬φ ∨ ¬φ)) 6 (φ ∧ ¦¬φ), theorem of K.
2) K φ 6 tφ, by the induction hypothesis.
3) K ¬φ 6 t¬φ, from 2 negate both sides and use t¬φ = ¬tφ.
4) K (tφ ∧ (¦t¬φ ∨ t¬φ)) 6 (φ ∧ ¦¬φ) Using 2 and 3 with line 1. 5) K (tφ ∧ t¦¬φ) 6 (φ ∧ ¦¬φ), from 4, using t¦¬φ = (¦t¬φ ∨ t¬φ)).
6) K tφ 6 φ, via 5 with (tφ∧t¦¬φ) = t(φ∧¦¬φ), φ = (φ∧¦¬φ). Let φ EA be an arbitrary formula from F EA and let φ be an arbitrary boxdot formula (a formula of normal modal logic is a boxdot formula if there is a formula of normal modal logic which it is the translation of ). From Lemma 1.3 we have,  1.4 For every φ EA there is some ψ such that,
Proof: tφ EA is a boxdot formula and from Lemma 1.3, K φ EA 6 tφ EA  1.5 For all φ , there is some ψ EA such that,
Proof: This follows from the fact that K (£φ ∧ φ) 6 (φ ∧ φ). Given φ , mark every £ and then replace every marked £ with .
Thus for every ψ there is an equivalent φ EA and for every φ EA there is an equivalent ψ ; which will we use? Both. S(5) can be re-written,
Similarly, S(G1) can be re-written, 
(by the definition of t). But by the faithful embedding just mentioned, KT T φ 3 ψ, contradiction.
The following rules of inference will be helpful,
We now outline our overall strategy. Given some φ hijk / P KT , we will construct a surrogate sentence, S(φ hijk ), and show K¨φ hijk S(φ hijk ). Each S(φ hijk ) will be constructed entirely out of φ and φ EA formulas, so that K tS(φ hijk ) 6 S(φ hijk ). Thus K¨φ hijk tS(φ hijk ). The final step in our strategy is to show that S(φ hijk ) fails in a reflexive model, and hence is not a theorem of KT .
In fact, for the last step, it will be sufficient to show that S(φ hijk ) fails in some model. As observed in Marcos [10] , if φ EA fails in any model, then it fails in a reflexive model. We repeat this proof below (Lemma 2.2). We end this introduction by stressing a basic fact about the language of essence and accident: the language is insensitive to reflexivity.
Given a normal modal logic L, let L EA = {φ EA |L φ EA }. Using an insight from Kuhn [8] , Marcos [10] introduced and gave a completeness proof for K EA (the minimal logic of essence and accident). In a follow-up article to Marcos [10] , Steinsvold [14] showed completeness results for various L EA logics. It was shown that for any normal modal logic L such that K L KT , K EA = L EA = KT EA . Also, since K EA = KT EA , to show that a logic L is not a counterexample to the Boxdot Conjecture, it is sufficient to show there is some φ EA P L − K; this is the strategy we employ.
  
A frame F = hW, Ri is a non-empty set W where R W ¢ W. Members of W are worlds or points. A valuation V is a function from the set of propositional variables into the power set of W. M = hW, R, Vi is a model. We define truth in a model at a world as follows:
There are infinitely many φ hijk P KT and we need to isolate them. This includes isolating those φ hijk which are also theorems of K (viz. p 3 p, £p 3 £p, and so on).
We prove the following Lemma and then the converse of it.
We show for the case of T £ sentences, using induction on i.
Base case, i = 0. Since i = 0 and i b j, j = 0. We know h = 0, thus we must show KT p 3 ¦ k p, for all k. Clearly, KT p 3 p. Since KT φ 3 ¦φ we have KT ¦ n p 3 ¦ n+1 p, for all n b 0. Thus, KT p 3 ¦ k p, for all k.
For the inductive step assume
The case for T ¦ sentences is a dual variation of this argument.
Proof: Assume φ hijk is neither a T £ nor a T ¦ sentence. Thus we know: 1) Either h T = 0 or i < j, and 2) Either j T = 0 or k < h.
We have four cases. 
 2: h T = 0 and k < h. To get a contradiction, assume,
Let M = hN, R, Vi, where xRy iff x = y or y is the immediate successor of x,
Since k is strictly less than h, M, 0
Contradiction.
 3: i < j and j T = 0. Assume KT proves this φ hijk . Substitute ¬p for p and take the contraposition of φ hijk . This case is isomorphic to the second case, and the same argument applies.
 4: i < j and k < h. i and k can't be lower than zero, thus h T = 0 and j T = 0. But this case is subsumed by the first case. 
  
For each φ hijk / P KT , we will construct a surrogate sentence, S(φ hijk ), where K¨φ hijk S(φ hijk ). Each S(φ hijk ) will be constructed entirely out of φ EA and φ sentences, so that K tS(φ hijk ) 6 S(φ hijk ).
To help introduce our surrogates, assume φ hijk / P KT . By Theorem 3.4 we know φ hijk is not a T £ sentence, i.e. either h T = 0 or i < j.
If h T = 0, we show there is a surrogate for φ hijk of the following form
If i < j, we show there exists a surrogate for φ hijk of the following form (where
We encourage the reader to view in advance the proof of Theorem 4.15 to gain a better notion of the direction of this section. We must show a number of preliminary results first.
We only need one surrogate for each φ hijk / P KT . S(φ hijk ) will represent an arbitrary surrogate for φ hijk , and we will give an official definition of surrogate for φ hijk below (Definition 4.16).
The general strategy is as follows. Given φ hijk / P KT , we want K to prove that the antecedent of S(φ hijk ) implies the antecedent of φ hijk . Furthermore, we want K to prove that the consequent of φ hijk implies the consequent of S(φ hijk ). Granting this, we have K¨φ hijk S(φ hijk ).
The next results pertain to the the consequents of φ hijk and S(φ hijk ).
Proof: By induction. The base case (n = 0) is: if K φ 3 ψ, K φ 3 ψ.
, from 2, weakening the consequent. 4) K £ n+1 φ 3 n+1 ψ, from 3 and the definition of .
and by the definition of t, t(q 3 p) = (q 3 p). For the inductive step,
, from 3 and definition of t.
Proof: From Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2.
Half of our strategy is fulfilled. Lemma 4.3 tells us K proves that the consequent of φ hijk implies the consequent of S(φ hijk ).
The next results pertain to the antecedents of φ hijk and S(φ hijk ). We need to show K proves that the antecedent of S(φ hijk ) implies the antecedent of φ hijk . To do this, we need the antecedent of S(φ hijk ) in a more manageable form. Focusing on the case where h is not zero, and letting h = n + 1, the
Most of the work in this section is in showing the above. In the next few results we work to show the sentence on the right hand of the bi-conditional above implies the antecedent of φ hijk . Once we have all of this, we can conclude that the antecedent of the surrogate implies the antecedent of φ hijk .
Proof: By induction on n. The base case is n = 0. But tp = p, K p 3 p.
1) K t£
Proof: By induction on n. Where n = 0 we have K t£ m p 3 t£ m p 
Proof: From Lemma 4.6 we have,
We now work to show K proves the converse of Lemma 4.7.
Proof: By induction on n. Where n = 0 (base case), K tφ 6 tφ.
, from 3, distributing the diamonds over disjunction.
14) K tφ 3 t¦ n φ, from 9, classical logic.
15) K tφ 3 (¦t¦ n φ ∨ t¦ n φ), weakening the consequent, from 14.
16) K tφ 3 t¦ n+1 φ, from 15 and the definition of t. 6 t¦ n+1 φ, 17 and 8.
¦¦ n t£ m p, from 1; Let φ be t£ n−1 ¦ m ¬p and ψ be ¦ n t£ m p.
3) K ¬t£ n−1 ¦ m ¬p 6 t¦ n−1 £ m p, from Corollary 1.7.
from lines 2 and 3.
Proof: Using a version of Corollary 4.9 we have,
¦¦ n t£ m p, (use the equivalence on line 1 and substitute into Lemma 4.10).
2) K ((£t£ n−1 ¦ m ¬p ∧ t£ n−1 ¦ m ¬p) ∧ ¦t¦ n £ m p) 3 ¦ n+1 t£ m p, from 1, strengthening the antecedent.
3) K (t£ n ¦ m ¬p ∧ ¦t¦ n £ m p) 3 ¦ n+1 t£ m p, 2, from the definition of t.
adding a conjunct to the consequent from the antecedent.
Proof: From Lemma 4.12 and Lemma 4.7 We now show the main results of this section.
Proof: If φ hijk / P KT , then by Theorem 3.4 we know, Either h T = 0 or i < j.
, from 1 and 2. 4) K¨φ hijk ¬t¦ n £ i p 3 ¦ n+1 £ i p, from Lemma 4.14. 5) K¨φ hijk ¬t¦ n £ i p 3 j t¦ k (q 3 p), from 3 and 4.  2: i < j. j can't be zero.
At this point, we revert back to line 2 of case 1 to derive,
We now officially define our surrogates. We end this section with an implementation of the method of constructing a surrogate in Theorem 4.15. Consider axiom 4, £p 3 ££p. Here, h = 0 but i < j (case 2) so we consider the dual version of 4, ¦¦p 3 ¦p. S(4) is thus,
K4 S(4), and in this case the reason is trivial: the antecedent of S(4) is contradictory in K4. That is, the antecedent of S(4) can't be true in a transitive model. The reader is encouraged to use this sentence to show that K4 is not a counterexample to the Boxdot Conjecture (note that a simpler sentence was given in [4] ; KT does not prove the 4 axiom, but K4 proves the translation of the 4 axiom).
     
The final step is to show that each S(φ hijk ) fails in a reflexive model, so that we know KT T S(φ hijk ). So far we have shown that for each φ hijk / P KT , there is some ψ (namely S(φ hijk )), such that K¨φ hijk tψ (by Theorem 4.19). Thus showing that S(φ hijk ) fails in a reflexive model is the final step.
We remark on the use of (q 3 p) in the consequent of S(φ hijk ). In many cases, p could replace (q 3 p). However, in other cases, it is necessary (cf. S(D c ))) thus we use it in all cases for the sake of uniformity.
There will be four cases in total, though two of the four will be subsumed under previous cases. We will work on each case individually, then put them together at the end to show the cases are exhaustive.
Before getting to individual cases we prove some preliminary results.
Proof: By construction of M, p fails at zero and all successors of zero up to and including n. Since t¬p = ¬p, By Lemma 5.3, t¦ i ¬p is true at worlds zero through n, including n. Thus we have,
Since p is true at world n + 1 and all higher worlds, M, n + 1 | = t£ i p (regardless of the size of i), thus M, 0 | = ¦ n+1 t£ i p.
Since k < h(= n + 1), and p fails at all worlds strictly less than h (and q is true everywhere),
By Theorem 4.15, there is a surrogate for φ hijk ,
Using Lemma 4.13 as in Case 1 (Subsection 5.1), we have,
It is this equivalent version of S(φ hijk ) we falsify in a reflexive model.
In the previous section, where j = 0, the size of k was important. As long as j T = 0, the size of k becomes irrelevant. We now construct our model. Let W = {w k , w j 1 , w j 2 , . . . , w j j−1 , w j j , 1, 2, 3, . . .}. Note that there are as many w j worlds as there are occurrences of in our surrogate, and by assumption j T = 0, thus there is at least one w j world. On the other hand, we only need one w k world (whether k = 0 or not). Also, 0 is not in our set of worlds, w j j will take the place of 0, and our surrogate will fail at w j j .
Define a the relation R on W as follows: w j j R1, 1R2, 2R3, . . . and, w j j Rw j j−1 , w j j−1 Rw j j−2 ...w j 2 Rw j 1 , w j 1 Rw k Using arrows to represent the relation R we have,
w k relates to no world, and is the only world which relates to no world. w j j relates to exactly two worlds, and is the only world which relates to more than one world. As mentioned in the introduction and shown in Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, we don't need to add that our model is reflexive. We will officially make it reflexive in our last step.
Proof: Using Cor. 1.7, ¬t¦ k (q 3 p) is equivalent to t£ k (q ∧ ¬p). By construction of the model t£ 0 (q ∧ ¬p) (i.e. (q ∧ ¬p)) is true at w k (in fact, it is the only world where q 3 p fails). By Corollary 5.1 and the fact that w k relates to no
Proof: As in the previous case, p is true at n + 1 and all the successors of n + 1, thus M, w j j | = ¦ n+1 t£ i p, regardless of the size of i.
p fails at all worlds strictly less than n + 1, all the w j worlds, and w k . By Lemma 5.3 (since t¬p = ¬p), t¦ i ¬p is true at all worlds strictly less than n + 1, all the w j worlds, and w k . Just as in Lemma 5.4, we use Corollary 5.2 to conclude
We now work to show the consequent of our S(φ hijk ) fails. First we need, For the inductive step assume M, w | = v t¦ k (q 3 p) for all w P {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
By construction of the model, each number relates to (and only to) its immediate successor. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, at each w, M,
The final step is to show j t¦ k (q 3 p) fails at w j j . Proof: By Lemma 5.11, a sentence equivalent to S(φ hijk ) fails in a model.
As mentioned it is sufficient to show S(φ hijk ) fails in some model. For if S(φ hijk ) fails, so does tS(φ hijk ) (by Theorem 4.18). tS(φ hijk ) is a boxdot formula, thus by Lemma 2.3, we can reflexivize the model and tS(φ hijk ) will still be false (and so S(φ hijk ) will also fail).
We now present our final results.  5.13 Where S(φ hijk ) is a surrogate for φ hijk , KT T S(φ hijk ).
Proof: Let S(φ hijk ) be a surrogate for φ hijk . By definition, φ hijk / P KT , thus by Theorem 3.4 we know that for S(φ hijk ), Assume i < j. In this case j can't be zero. Now either h T = 0 or h=0. If
, where j = n + 1. In this case our argument is the same as Case 1. Assume h T = 0. This is subsumed by Case 2.
 5.14 For all φ hijk / P KT, (Wψ)(K¨φ hijk tψ and KT T ψ)
Proof: By Theorem 4.19, for all φ hijk / P KT there is some S(φ hijk ), and Kφ hijk tS(φ hijk ). By Theorem 5.13, KT T S(φ hijk )  5.15 The Boxdot Conjecture holds for all K¨φ hijk .
Proof: It holds trivially when φ hijk PKT . If φ hijk / P KT use Theorem 5.14  I thank an anonymous referee for many comments which greatly improved this article. I also thank Brian Schmitz (for being a mensch).
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